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ABSTRACT
The issue of early deliveries and their consequences for
the Navy are new concepts which depart rather significantly
from customary government thinking, where late delivery is
the primary concern. The government normally accepts
supplies when they are delivered, even if earlier than
required. This thesis investigated whether or not early
deliveries do in fact occur, and if so, whether they are a
significant problem for the government.
The objective of the research effort, once it was
established that early deliveries do in fact occur, was to
explore those factors and costs associated with receipt of
material prior to the required delivery date. Emphasis was
placed on the factors of holding costs and production lead
time as they relate to the costs and consequences of early
deliveries .
In summary, early deliveries do occur. There are no
shelf-life problems associated with the early receipt of
material. There are opportunity costs incurred in the
holding and paying for material delivered early.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
What costs are associated with the early deliveries of
material before the Required Delivery Date (RDD)? The
Department of Defense (DOD) presently accepts supplies when
they are delivered, even if earlier than required. This
early acceptance may be costly, when the early delivery is
not desired. Civilian industry is moving to embrace various
management concepts of minimum inventory levels with the most
extreme of these views being "just in time". Under tliese
concepts early delivery of procured material is a foreign
concept. Early deliveries are not free. But what is the
cost to the government, and how significant is it?
The issue of early deliveries and their consequences for
the Navy was first raised by Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA). The early delivery of shelf-life material was a
primary concern and the subsequent deterioration of the
material before it could be issue. This led to NAVSEA's
recommendation that the Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR) be amended to include clauses prohibiting the early
delivery of material and services unless specifically allowed
in the contract. For the specific language proposed by
NAVSEA see Appendix A. This concept departs significantly
from customary government practice, where late delivery is the
primary concern. Having no information available to support
or refute this hypothesis, the Office of Naval Acquisition
Support (ON AS), prior to its disestablishment and absorption
into the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding
and Logistics, requested that the issue be investigated to
see if there was merit in bringing it before the Defense
Acquisition Regulations (DAR) Council. If this issue proves
to be a significant problem, the DAR Council will need to
take action. If there is no demonstrated evidence that
early deliveries are a burden, NAVSEA's recommendation for
amending the FAR can be returned with evidence that there is
no problem .
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question, which was the focus for
this research is:
What effect does the early delivery of material have on
managements ability to control expenditures?
From this basic question, three subsidiary questions were
developed :
1. Are early deliveries an extensive problem with certain
industries or products?
2. What are the positive and negative affects of DOD's
ability to manage inventories?
3. Would contract clauses specifying window delivery
schedules be an effective means of dealing with early
delivery?
C.' RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research concentrates on the area of acquisition of
spare parts for inventory replenishment. The logical choice
for a source of information when dealing with any issue
concerning the procurement of spare parts for the Navy is
one of the Navy's two Inventory Control Points. The source
selected for this research was the Navy Ships Parts Control
Center (SPCC), Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. The cope of
this research effort has been limited to SPCC managed items
and to "C" type spare contracts. It is relatively easy to
identify whether material is delivered for production type
contracts for the routine acquisition of spare parts early,
on time, or late, because of the very nature of the material
purchased .
Information has been gathered from various sources at
SPCC including the procurement community and the item
manager community. Some of the information was strictly the
opinion of the various individuals and backed-up or
amplified the data provided. SPCC ' s Contracts Completed
File was the source of data for this research. This database
contains approximately 14,000 records of procurement actions
completed before RDD. The database consists of purchase
orders, delivery orders, and "C" type contracts. Purchase
orders are small purchases. Delivery orders may be for
stock, but all are negotiated (normally sole source)
actions. "C" type contracts are for inventory replenishment
and are awarded for either competitive or negotiated (sole
source) solicitations. Since the research effort
concentrated on replenishment of inventories, the data base
was queried for all "C" type contracts completed before RDD
.
A computer printout of 5A5 "C" type contracts was generated.
Appendix B contains the listing.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The primary research methodologies employed were a
combination of analysis of empirical data and telephone
interviews.
The empirical data for this research v^;as a computer
listing of 5454 "C" type contracts completed before RDD
Contracts delivered within 60 days of the RDD were no
considered to be significantly early. Of the 545 contracts
delivered early 246 (45%) were completed more than 60 days
early. Of the 14,000 contracts completed early, 6530 (46%)
were completed more than 60 days early. The early contracts
were broken down into 30 days periods. A total cost-to-hold
was derived by applying the holding cost rate to the total
contract values per period. The data provided the number of
contractors and inventory managers involved in early deli-
veries as well as the types of material that are delivered
early .
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The structure of the interviews was established from a
series of questions identified during an extensive review of
the current literature. VHile the data on contracts deli-
vered early was readily made available, no direct contact
was possible with the individual inventory managers. The
program Support Office of the Weapons Systems Support Group
(05 Staff) did not want the daily routine of the IMs
interrupted by telephone calls and questions from the
researcher. Thus the scope of the interviews was limited by
the 05 Staff who acted as the filter between the researcher
and the inventory managers. The 05 staff personnel
investigated selected contracts upon request and provided
specified information. Upon completion of the review of
the data from SPCC, interviews wee conducted with a number
of contractors who were found to have delivered material
early
.
The secondary research methodology employed was an
extensive review of relevant literature. The review was
conducted to obtain an historical perspective on delivery
schedules and their formulation. Various sources such as
the Naval Postgraduate School Library, the Defense
Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), the Defense
Systems Management College were used. Various current
publications proved helpful in the formulation of
11
perceptions. These useful sources of information are
contained in the reference and bibliography sections of this
paper .
The information thus obtained was analyzed, compared,
and contracted in order to obtain a picture of the various
institutional forces, effects and considerations relevant
to the problems of early delivery in the management of
wholesale spare parts.
E. ORGANIZATION
Chapter Two describes the legal and regulatory
framework of the procurement process within which the early
delivery problem operates, as well as the real and perceived
affects of early deliveries on DOD. The role and
responsibilities of SPCC as a Navy Inventory Control Point are
described. A description is given in the characteristics of
the work performed by inventory managers and a summary of
how the environment effects the way they respond.
Chapter III gives a detailed examination of the prime
cause of early deliveries: required delivery dates which
are based on over-estimates of production lead times.
Chapter IV discusses the specific costs that can be
directly associated with early deliveries. This chapter
specifically concentrates on holding costs and its various
elements. This chapter also describes tlie relationship of
holding costs to reorder quantities and reorder points.
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Chapter V presents an analysis and description of the
data obtained fro in SPCC. The estimated extent of the
delivery problem is assessed. The causes of the problem are
identified and categorized. Considerations for further
actions are given. This chapter presents the availability
and effectiveness of remedies and controls are described.
Chapter VI is a summary of the researcher's findings and





DOD's inventory management mission is to provide
material where and '.vhen needed to support a given unit
mission within financial constraints. The inventory man-
agers (liMs) and procurement personnel in the various DOD
inventory control systems must acquire the correct materials
in correct quantities, from appropriate sources, at the
right time to support DOD's numerous missions. [1:7]
In industry, companies are aware of and can substantially
influence any one or more of the variables in the acquisi-
tion cycle: getting the right quality, quantity, and
prices, from the right source at a specified time. Within
DOD, acquisition personnel are governed by the provisions of
the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and it's supple-
ment, the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR). The FAR
specifies the types of procurement actions which may occur.
In addition, there are numerous laws, policies, and regula-
tions imposed by Congress and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to protect the public interest. These socio-
economic considerations result in procedural limitations
which serve to limit acquisition personnel in their ability
to control the variables that their counter-parts in
industry can control.
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There is no portion of the FAR that deals explicitly
with early deliveries. Parts 12 and 52 of the FAR address,
in generic terras, the delivery of material. Appendix C
contains the appropriate clauses from the FAR dealing with
delivery of material. According to the FAR Part 12:
The time of delivery of performance is an essential
contract element and shall be clearly stated in
solicitations. Contracting officers shall ensure that
delivery of performance schedules are realistic and meet
" the requirements of the acquisition. [2:12.101]
Part 52:212 of the FAR provides those clauses that the
contracting officer may insert in solicitations and
contracts for supplies or services. Thus the FAR Part 12
and 52 pertain to the delivery and performance aspects the
contract, but do not address early delivery explicitly.
The Services within DOD manage highly complex, widely
dispersed inventories of spares and repair parts. The value
of tliese inventories is over $50 billion. This inventory
provides the material support needed to ensure that weapon
systems' readiness and military operational capability are
maintained to fulfill US commitments and tactical goals.
The Services have traditionally relied upon serai-
mathematical inventory models, sophisticated information
systems, and complex logistics support procedures to ensure
that inventory costs are minimized, consistent with assigned
readiness goals and desired logistics support capabilities
within financial constraints. [3:1-1]
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Ensuring that required materials is delivered at
the right time is one of the most critical of the variables.
Spare parts must be identified and procured in such a manner
as to allow sufficient time for delivery to the end user,
with consideration given for production, inspection and
shipment. As noted by Lee [1:8] material should be delivered
at the time desired by the requester. It should neither be
earlier nor latter than the required delivery date (RDD).
The material, allowing for anticipated contractor lead
times, sliould be procured such that it is available to the
requester at the point in time considered necessary to meet
the customer's requirements. DOD has found this to be an
elusive goal: trying to ensure that supplies arrive at their
designated sites on time, whether it is 1958 or 1986. It
has been estimated that throughout DOD, one contract in four
has not met its delivery schedule. [1:8] There is nothing
new or startling in this discovery, for as early as 1958
Harbridge House Inc., in a study for DOD, reported that:
46% of the total lead times were longer than predicted by
an average of 3.3 months late. Thus nearly half of the
procurements were delivered late and the average tardiness
(3.3 months) amounted to 43% of the predicted lead time.
On the other hand, 31% of the procurements were delivered
early, by an average of 2.7 months early. While these
early deliveries cannot hurt performance, needlessly long
predicted lead times do cause unnecessary investment in
pipeline investment because of the higher reorder levels.
In studying predicted versus actual ALT ' s and PLT's,
57% of the alt's were greater than predicted (by an
average of 3.4 months), while only 18% of the PLT's were
greater than predicted (by an average of 2.6 months).
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Conversely 17% of the ALT's were less than predicted (by
an average of 1.2 months) and 57% of the PLT's were less
than predicted (by an average of 2.3 months). ALT has been
underestimated and PLT has been overestimated. [4:21]
In a similar vein a GAO study of DOD component's use of
differing methods for projecting PLT resulted in a GAO
con ten t ion
:
Inaccurate PLT information is being use
. . .
to determine
secondary item requirements. While some items had
understated requirements, the vast majority of items were
overstated. GAO observed that these inaccuracies resulted in
a less than optimum use of secondary funding. Follow-up
information in 198A from GAO verifies their original
contention. Updated information was obtained on 212 of
the original 257 sample items. Of these, the PLT has been
changed on 175 items; 142 items reflect decreasing PLT, 33
reflect increases in PLT. [5:7]
While conducting the literature search, the researcher
was unable to uncover any specific research directed at
early deliveries of material as a problem for DOD. The very
thought that early deliveries could be a relevant or serious
problem had not been addressed in any research. Al research
concerning deliveries dealt with the problems associated
with delinquent contracts. At most the subject was
addressed, as in the Harbridge House study, as a one-liner
or as a sidelight in comments on delinquent contracts.
However, it should be noted that potential areas of research
were indicated concerning the cost-of-holding material and




B. SPCC - INVENTORY CONTROL POINT
Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC), Mechanicsburg,
Pennsylvania is one of two Navy Inventory Control Points
(IGP), (the other being the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania). SPCC's mission is to provide
cost effective and responsible supply support to the fleet.
[1:19] In support its customers, SPCC provides enhanced
combat readiness to the fleet.
SPCC manages an inventory of over 500,000 line items.
This material ranges from valves, pumps and seals to complex
electrical components for missile systems. SPCC also has
the central management responsibility for conventional
ammunition. [6:3-4] While SPCC manages many line items, few
of these items are physically stocked at SPCC. Rather,
these items are distributed world wide at various Naval
Supply Centers (NSC), Naval Supply Depots (NSD) and aboard
numerous Fleet Stores Ships located where they are
accessible to the fleet. Through these stockpoints, SPCC
monitors the material transactions of these items world-'./ide
and can directly control the issue of critical items. Thus
the Navy wholesale supply system is a complex operation
involving numerous interfacesworld-wide with continuous
transactions occurring. The Navy's supply system's
customers obtain material using decentralized requisitioning
procedures for most of what they require, submitting their
18
requirements for niaterial to the Navy stock point i. n their
area of operations. Normally, material issues will take
place from the stock point closest to the customer with
the st(3ck point reporting the issue to SPCC via a Transaction
Item Report (TIR). If the stock point cannot fill the
request, the requisition document is passed to the applicable
ICP via the AUTODIN communications network for action. If
SPCC locates the item, the stock point having it will
forward it to the customer. If, however, SPCC cannot fill
the request, the requirement will either be back ordered or a
spot buy will be made.
The process of making material available for issue
involves requirements determination, material procurement and
procurement funding. These functions make up the core of
spec's Supply Operations Group (SOG). The SOG's five major
functions which relate to the deployment/operations phase of
weapon systems life cycle support are: requirements
determination, material procurement, procurement funding,
material issue and repairable's management. The I Ms are
able to accomplish this by using computers to process multi-
variable data which includes procurement lead time
(administrative lead time and production lead time), risk,
holding cost, and safety levels to determine a reorder point
and an economic order quantity (EOQ) for each stocked item.
TIRs provide the current input data on what material has
19
been received and \^fhat has been issued. The system of
recording TIRs and referrals is the means by which the IM
obtains information about what is occurring with their
items, SPCC Uniform Inventory Control Programs (UICP) use
this information to compare the actual stocked levels of
material with projected requirements and monitors the status
of each line item. These programs determine whether or not
a buy is necessary, based on the current stock level, and
the predetermined reorder level. The result is a
recommendation to the IM to either buy or repair material to
meet the customer's need [6:3-7; 1:21]
To fulfill its customer's needs, SPCC engages in routine
stock buys to meet anticipated demand. SPCC will also
initiate spot buys for items not carried or for high
priority requirements for items not in stock. In FY85, SPCC
engaged in over 63,600 acquisition actions at a value in
excess of $1.4 billion. The bulk of these actions, 56,800,
were small purchase actions. According to SPCC,
historically approximately 90% of their total actions (small
purchases) account for 20% of the funds obligated. Spot buys
are normally for a quantity of one each to fill an immediate
requirement
.
Funding for stock procurements come from the Navy Stock
Fund (NSF) which is a revolving fund. The fleet users order
material carried by (or under) the stock fund, pay for it
20
out of their assigned operating fund, and SPCC then
replenishes (or repairs) its stocks with tiie fleet provided
funds .
As an inventory control points, SPCC is responsible for
managing weapon system life cycle support. As such, SPCC
decides who, what, when and how the Navy will provide
logistic support to a weapon system. At the same time that
the hardware systems commands are releasing the first
production contracts, SPCC is determining the inventory
management responsibilities and the range and depth of spare
parts support for the system, as well as building computer
and technical files that support the system and preparing
and publishing the Allowance Parts List. [1:22]
When the weapon system is actually delivered to the
fleet, spec's Supply Operations Group must support it. The
initially provisioned spare parts are supposed to last until
actual demand patterns have been established via usage data
to make requirement determinations. Program support and the
supply support for weapon systems proceed simultaneously
with the inventory manager (SPCC) having prime responsibility
to support the system in the fleet. [1:25]
C. INVENTORY MANAGERS (IMs)
The Ims at SPCC are primarily responsible for ensuring
that spare parts are available where and when needed to
support fleet operations. Their responsibilities in carrying
21
out this taSiC are complicated by:
- conflicting task objectives;
- pressures from superiors and customers;
- diverse organizational and personnel interfaces required
in the complex wholesale supply system environment;
- plus a world-wide disbursed fleet.
Each IM must determine when and how many unites of repair or
buy; where to best position this material to meet demands;
how to dispose of excess material; and how to obtain an
appropriate procurement budget.
On' a daily basis the IM must decide which units to buy
or repair and what quantities to procure in order to do well
on their measures of support performance. Unfortunate, they
must perform well without creating long supply assets or
exceeding funding constraints. They are required to have
neither too little nor too much. This in an impossible task
in an environment where an IM may manage a thousand line
items, and where each line item has numerous of pieces of
informations that are subject to change. Because of
personnel constraints and supply operations, each IM must
depend on many people throughout the ICP and the supply
system to buy, repair, package, ship and place their
material in storage. Similarly, when locating the material
for future demands, the IM must decide how much is too much
or too little at any site. The disposal of excess material
22
raises the question of how much stock is truly excess to
future demands .[ 6 : 7 1-72 ]
D. ECONOMIC ORDER QUANTITIES
An inventory is essentially an idle resource which is
being temporarily stored for use at some future time. The
primarily purpose of storing resources is to separate the
supply and demand processes. DOD logistics systems have
long used inventories to compensate for or to buffer
operating problems and deficiencies in procurement,
transportation, warehousing, and maintenance. Because DOD
inventory requirements are basically developed under the
previously mentioned logistics operating system philosophy,
as processing times and leadtimes grow, inventories also
grow to accommodate them. [3:-4-3]
Because maintaining any type of inventory incurs
expenses, the benefits of holding the inventory must equal
or exceed the holding and ordering costs. The process of
balancing these costs and the benefits is inventory
management. Inventory management is a pivotal activity in
any logistics organization. It requires tradeoffs in
balancing customer service needs with operating costs. This
management task is particularly challenging in the military
setting where item availability often affects mission
readiness. The two fundamental issues in controlling any
inventory are when to order and how much to order. When the
23
demand for an item is uncertain, a level of safety or buffer
stock must be carried to meet unpredicted demand when making
these decisions. [7:2]
Inventory management attempts to balance the costs and
benefits of holding stock. This balance is directly
affected by the level of stock held by the organization.
Low stock levels result in low customer service and high
ordering costs. High stock levels increase the level of
customer service while decreasing ordering costs. However,
high stock levels can have undesirable effects such as
increased storage costs, high capital investment and
increased risk of obsolescence. High stock levels will
increase holding costs. When stock levels and service levels
increase, holding costs will increase and ordering costs
decrease. [7:20]
The traditional inventory models used by DOD are based
on the cost minimization principles used the commercial
enterprises for which the models were originally developed.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has adopted the models as a
basis for inventory decisions, even though DOD's objectives
do not always include cost minimization. Within the
services, inventory management decisions are more typically
directed towards maximizing the support of the forces,
within the budget limits set by the policy makers. [8:1]
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For DOD the total variable costs of stockage are
composed of numerous elements which can be classified as:
(1) cost to order, (2) cost to hold, or shortage costs.
Economic inventory policy is an effort to minimize the total
variable costs. This is achieved when holding costs for an
item equals the cost of ordering over tlie same time period.
The quantity ordered each time the reorder point is reached
brings the total stock on hand on delivery date back to a
desirable level. The only deviation from an exact balance
between holding cost and cost to order is the cost of holding
the safety level quantity for its life-span beyond the next
delivery date. [9:2]
The wholesale replenishment model used by SPCC is a cost
minimization EOQ inventory model. A stock item's order
quantity and reorder level are established in large part by
the unit price and procurement lead time forecasted for the
item. When a replenishment is needed, the order quantity is
specified and the procurement officer requests bids from
vendors who provide both a unit price and production lead
time .
SPCC treats the wholesale level inventory management of
an item and the procurement of replenishment stock as
separate functions, although they are key elements of the
same supply system and share the common goal of maximum
fleet support within limited budgets.
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The UICP inventory models determine the reorder level
and order quantity based on data from recent procurements.
When the inventory drops below the computed reorder point, a
buy order is generated with an IG? established delivery
date. After the order is placed, a new reorder point and
reorder quantity is computed for replenishing the inventory.
There is an inventory level at which the total costs of
shortages, ordering and holding the inventory are minimized.
If the sole objective of inventory management were to mini-
mize these costs and they could be quantified, the inventory
level would be found by minimizing the sum of the ordering
costs, shortage costs, and the holding costs. This
inventory level would determine the level of service. But
not all shortages, ordering and holding costs can be
quantified. There are two other inventory management
objectives in addition to minimizing the quantifiable
shortage, ordering and holding costs. One is to provide a
certain level of service. The second is to reduce or limit
the size of the inventory. For DOD, the level of service is
actually a measure of shortage costs, while inventory size
is a substitute for the opportunity cost of the inventory
investment, which is one of the holding costs. these costs
are difficult to measure, and for DOD, it is often not
possible to quantify them. Therefore, the basic objective
of inventory management for DOD is to minimize the
26
quantifiable ordering and holding costs, provide a certain
level of support to the forces, and limit the size of the
inventory due to budgetary constraints. [7:21]
Inventories with stochastic demands and procurement
leadtimes require that safety stocks be maintained to absorb
the variations in demand and lead time. Safety stocks also
reduce the possibility of stockouts caused by leadtime and
demand forecast errors. At SPCC safety stocks must be
carried because both the demand and lead time are
stochastic. Safety stocks are the difference between the
expected demand for a period and the level of stocks held to
meet the demand for the period. Under the continuous review
situations, spare parts are ordered when the inventory level
reaches the reorder point. The difference between the reorder
point and the safety stock level is the expected or mean
demand during the procurement leadtime. The safety stock will
(hopefully) fulfill the demands in excess of the expected
demand. The excess demand represents the demand forecast
error demand variability during the leadtime period. If the
demand forecast error and variability exceeds the level of
safety stocks held, stock-outs may occur and backorders
accumulate. Conversely if such a large demand fails to
occur, there will be excess stock on hand. Spare parts will
become excess material or long supply. [7:24]
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There is no single universal model of successful
inventory management due to the wide variety of production
requirements and the differences in shortage, ordering and
holding costs within and between industries. Near-term and
long-terra fluctuations in market conditions demand different
material management strategies.
Holding costs and production lead times (PLT) play major
roles in the determination of safety levels and thus reorder
points in the EOQ models. An erroneous PLT forecast can
lead to excessive delivery dates (material delivered early)
or too short delivery dates (material delinquent). This
issuewill be addressed in detail in Chapter III.
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III. PRODUCTION LEAD TIME
A. BACKGROUND
For each item managed by the ICP, the UCIP EOQ T.odel
used by SPCC computes the value of the reorder point and the
order quantity which minimize the average annual variable
costs of ordering, holding, and time-weighted backorders for
the item manager. These models are based on the traditional
steady -state continuous review lot size reorder point models
for stochastic demands. They operate under the assumption
that there is a constant price and a constant procurement
lead time for each item. With the assumption of a constant
price, the average annual total procurement costs is a
constant value independent of tlie decision variables, order
quantity and reorder point. As a consequence, this cost
terra can be ignored in computing the reorder level. However,
both procurement cost and production lead time (a portion of
procurement lead time) can vary depending on which vendor is
chosen. The impact of lead time on the optimization is
concentrated in the determination of the reorder point.
However, the determination of the reorder point influences
not only the service level (shortages) but also the expected
inventory holding costs. [6:3-A-15; 10:9]
The UICP inventory management models at SPCC determine
the optimum order quantity and reorder level for an item
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based on that item's forecasted quarterly demand rate,
procurement lead time and unit price. Therefore, leadtime
forecasts are one of the factors that must be considered in
the planning and budgeting process for new weapons systems,
spare parts support of operational systems, and all ICP
inventory requirements determinations. As long as material
and component leadtimes are following historical patterns,
the leadtimes can be assumed by be fairly reliable for
future planning. However, if actual leadtimes are
significantly different from forecasted leadtimes errors are
introduced into the inventory management process. For
example, the timing of replenishment of spare pai'ts has been
based on the leadtimes actually experienced on the last
order for each particular part. If the leadtime has
increased greatly, the probability of not maintaining
adequate support of operational systems increases greatly.
A crisis management situation will evolve as the IM tries to
support the forces. Conversely, if leadtime has decreased
considerable, the parts are ordered in advance of the actual
need--at the potential expense of other needs (opportunity
costs) and with an increased risk of obsolescence or having
excess material in inventory requiring disposal. [11:2-3]
Thus the accurate forecast of leadtimes is an essential
ingredient in the ability of planners and managers to
accurately forecast their resource requirements and provide
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additional insight into necessary modifications to inventory
holdings. It is crucial for military planners to more
accurately determine their true needs as the competition for
scarce resources increases.
Leadtiraes vary from item to item within companies. They
can also vary markedly for the same item from company to
company. The exploration of the numerous reasons for this
variability would entail a substantial research effort.
However, some of these reasons are the result of various
buying policies, inventory practices, relationships with
vendors, the product being procured, and its particular
specifications, imagination of purchasing staff and adequacy
of planning [11:24]
B. PRODUCTION LEAD TIME (PLT)
The forecast of procurement lead time is one of the most
significant factors in the inventory management process
because it helps determine when an order will be placed.
Procurement lead time consists of:
a. Administrative Lead Time (ALT) - The time from when
the requirements document is generated to the date
when the contract is signed.
b. Production Lead Time (PLT) - The time from the date of
the contract to the date of receipt of the first
significant contract delivery. [12:1]
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The wholesale replenishment model is a cost minimization
inventory model
.
EOQ Model: Q= VsxAxD/IxC
Where: A = Administrative Ordering cost per order
D = Quantity demanded per calendar quarter
I = Holding cost per year.
C = Replacement cost per year.
The Economic Order Quantity is the square root of 8 times
the cost to order times the quarterly demand divided by
the holding cost rate times the unit price.
The Reorder Level (RL) is computed:
RL = DxL + SL
Where: L = Procurement Lead Time in quarters
SL = Safety level, a function of demand and
leadtirae availability and the desired
level of service.
D = Demand per quarter.
The variable operating costs of the wholesale system are
assumed to be:
Ordering Costs x Holding costs + Shortage costs
Where Ordering costs are the ICP internal administrative
costs of placing orders .... The holding costs are
those costs associated with maintaining on hand
inventories - storage, obsolescence and opportunity costs.
The shortage costs are those costs representing the cost
to the system of incurring backorders. The objective is
to find the order quantity, reorder level, repair quantity
and repair level for each item that minimizes these
variable costs. [6:3-24; 3-A-15]
If an item is ordered too early, scarce resources are tied
up in unnecessary inventories. If stock is ordered too late,
there will be backorders before new deliveries are received
with the possibility that a spot buy will be required.
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Under current procedures at SPCC, it is assumed that the
ALT and PLT on the next buy will be tJie same as the ones on
the .Tiost recent buy. Thus a stocked item's order quantity
and reorder level are established in large part by the unit
price and procurement lead time forecasted for it. The
potential for under- or over- stating lead time is
significant, as noted by Harbridge House Inc. and GAO in
Chapter II, resulting in management problems due to spares
either going into long-supply or developing shortages and
back orders.
C. PLT AND RDD
A March 1984 DOD study of secondary item procurement
leadtiraes concluded that for FY83 PLT for all secondary
items within DOD exceed $15 billion. The study stated that
one day of leadtime equates to approximately $30 million--
inaccurate and unrealistic estimates of Leadtime can be quite
costly. Overestimates of leadtime ties up funding that
could be better utilized elsewhere, and increases the
likelihood of long supply conditions and excess material
that will have to be disposed of. Underestimated lead times
result in stock-outs and a degradation of material and
operational readiness [5:1]
The DOD study of secondary item procurement further
concluded that all DOD components end administrative lead
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time and begin production lead time at the contract award
date. Defense contractors consider that the estimated
delivery date specified in the contract is their lead time
of record that that the ICPs should use that date to update
PLTs. Since the contractor is legally obligated to meet
the EDD, its use in PLT computation is valid. Most Defense
contractors use lead time quotes from their vendors and
subcontractors to develop lead time data. These contractors
believe that valid quotes are far superior to historical
data because quotes reflect current market conditions,
whereas historical based projections of PLT tend to dilute
the fluctuations in the economy. [5:7-13]
The soliciting of contractor quotes of lead time can be
very useful in the inventory control process to establish an
RDD. The contractors can be a valuable source of lead time
information. If contractor information is considered valid,
their leadtirae estimates should be used whether they
represent increases or decreases in the PLT used in tlieir
requirements computations.
However, the IMs can not totally ignore historical data.
For example, there are several examples where a major
contractor quoted leadtimes which the ICPs used in their
requirements computation only to have that contractor
consistently deliver much earlier than quoted. A PLT quote
of 14 months was used by an ICP for requirements computation
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purposes even though each of the last 3 procurements were
delivered in under 5 months. The IM must be aware of the
possibility that the contractor will try to beat the system.
The leadtime quoted not only affects the quantity ordered
but also affects the required delivery data specified in the
procurement contract. [5:48]
Nevertheless, with proper monitoring, using estimates
of leadtimes from contractors to determine the delivery schedule
in the solicitation document, the probability of more
realistic RDD's is increased. The more realistic the RDD the
less likely it is that the material will be delivered
earlier than required or that the contract will become
delinquent
.
Early delivery as well as delinquent contracts are
associated with unrealistic RDD's in government
solicitations. These RDD's are the consequence of using
inaccurate estimates of PLT in the inventory management
models .
In order to remain eligible to receive the contract, a
contractor's bid must be responsive to the solicitation. If
an unrealistic RDD is incorporated in the solicitation
the contractor may bid unreal istically and hope that
everything will fall into place in order to meet the RDD.
This system feeds upon itself. If there were a reduction in
the use of unrealistic RDDs the government would be
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receiving material on time more often, rather than earlier
orlaterthan requested.
The Navy's ICPs treat the wholesale level inventory
management of an item and the procurement of replenishment
stocks for that item as separate functions. But both of
these functions are key elements of the same supply system
and share the goal of maximum fleet support within annual
budget constraints. The UICP inventory models determine
the reorder level and order quantity based on historical data
from the most recent procurements. When the inventory
position of an item drops below the computed reorder point,
and order is sent to the procurement department to buy the
computed reorder quantity. The procurement department then
solicits bids from potential vendors. The vendor selected
is usually the one who has bid the lowest unit price and can
deliver within the ICP estimated desired delivery date.
Sometime later the UICP inventory models receive the new
price and production lead time values of the vendor winning
the contract. ^ new reorder point and order quantity are
the computed and form the basis for tlie next procurement
replenishment stock and the cycle begins all over again.
[10:8]
D. PLT: GOVERNMENT VS INDUSTRY
Private industries have come to realize that inventories
are not only costly but can also be used to hide inefficient
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operating practices. In response to this recognition pri-
vate companies are finding new and innovative means to reduce
inventories without degrading customer support. [3:iii]
The available data clearly show that the private sector
has reduced inventories relative to sales since 1980. In
contrast the DOD has experienced a significant growth in
inventories relative to customer demands for the same
period. About one-half of this growth in DOD peacetime
inventories is the consequence of force structure expansion
and modernization and to long-needed enhancements to support
operational readiness of the forces. The remainder of th.
e
growth in DOD inventories is the consequences of the speci-
fic management policies of DOD inventory managers and ac-
quisition personnel. The major difference in inventory
control procedures between the private sector and DOD is
that private industries can more effectively control pro-
curement leadtirae thus reducing on-order requirements. They
can also order smaller quantities on a more frequent basis
to minimize on-hand inventories. This is accomplished
through practices not currently found in DOD, such as the
negotiation of both price and lead times, consolidated pro-
curements, time-phased deliveries, multi-year procurement,
and sharing of requirements data with major suppliers.
[3:iii]
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In DOD, procurement leadtime at $15 billion is the
largest single element of inventory requirements. Leadtimes
have continued to grow since 1980 and are now 3 to U times
longer than those experienced by private firms for th. e same
or similar material. [3:iii] The other two elements of
inventory management, safety levels and operating levels,
are also much higher in the DOD than in the private sector.
DOD safety levels and operating levels are higher than the
private sector because of the increased lengthening of lead
times. Inventories on-hand and the quantities on-order are
generated by the DOD inventory requirements determination
syscem, which is based on demand, costs, leadtirae, and
performance goals. Because DOD accepts the existing
inventory management determination process, there is a
failure to recognize that existing requirements may be high
because the basic process of determining requirements
results in overstated or excessive quantities. Thus
overstated leadtimes can lead to. I Ms ordering excessive
quantities ahead of true needs. [3:1-1]
The actual inventories on-hand and on-order are the
result of several factors in the EOQ model used by SPCC.
Among the most important of these factors are (a) the
inventory requirements, or computed inventory levels, which
determine how much inventory is desired, and (b) the
accuracy in demand and leadtime forecasts. Inventories in
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support of demand of a stochastic nature such as DOD's
demand-based requirements determination process are composed
of three elements: operating levels based on order
quantities, leadtimes-levels based on projected demand
during leadtime, and safety levels generated to reduce the
probability of a zero balance or not-in-stock position
during leadtime. \^hile all have experience growth in
constant dollars since 1980, leadtime - the largest single
component of the total demand based requirement has grown
most rapidly in absolute terms. [3:3-1]
There is great similarity in the actual computational'
methods used by DOD and private industry for setting opera-
ting level and safety level inventories. Differences that
do exist arise from the efforts of private industries to
control those costs associated with leadtimes. This allows
them to reduce both safety level and operating level inven-
tories. The standard economic order quantity methods, coup-
led with variable safety level computations common to the
DOD are found in private sector firms with only minor diff-
erences in the customer inventories between DOD and private
firms . [3:4-2]
In private industry, leadtimes are not accepted as a
fact of life but rather are an integral part of the procure-
ment negotiation process, and material requirements are
adjusted to reflect the results of the leadtime negotiation.
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The private sector forces production lead times to be as
short as possible, and seeks the lowest material cost (not
the lowest unit price) in procurement decisions. DOD, on
the other hand, accepts long production leadtimes as a fact
of life and buys accordingly. As leadtimes grow, the
inventory requirements determination process adjusts to
accommodate them by increasing the size of the inventory.
[3:4-5; 4-14]
In the DOD inventory management process, the production
leadtime is used to determine the amount to buy. The
procurement leadtime for routine stock replenishmeiit is
seldom an issue as long as it is possible to locate a vendor
that will accept the government's required delivery date,
which is based on the leadtime forecast. Leadtimes are
observed, measured and normally funded in the budget process
but not managed. There is no attempt by DOD to reduce
leadtimes, they are accepted as a given.
The ever growing administrative leadtimes and production
leadtimes represent real costs to DOD and tlie Services:
- safety levels grow to accommodate the longer production
leadtimes to provide protection against the risks of
stock-out
;
- demand forecasts, made months or years before the
requirement is needed become increasingly inaccurate and
lead to the acquiring of inappropriate material in the
wrong quantities;
- long ALT and PLT create long inventory pipelines and
increase the likelihood of over shipments, early
shipments and errors in material receiving and storage;
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when material prices are based on time of delivery rather
than on tioie or receipt of an order, lengthy production
leadtiraes in periods of inflations result in higher
costs ;
the existence of extremely long ALT and PLT leadtimes
creates a DOD outlay liability of significant
proportions especially if actual leadtimes are shorter
than estimated leadtimes. [13:5-5] With the coming
reductions in budgets more realistic leadtiraes are
required to ensure that scarce DOD dollars are invested
in the correct inventories. Inthe future DOD will have
to maintain operational readiness with ever fewer
dollars .
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IV. HOLDTNG-COSTS: A COST OF EARLY DELIVERY
A. GENERAL
Holding Cost, carrying cost, and the cost-to- hold are
synonyms for the costs of holding an inventory to meet future
demand. In light of the billions of dollars held in
inventory throughout DOD it's clear that the inventory
carrying costs can be significant. Holding costs may be
considered the monetary penalty incurred for retaining
inventory to fill future requi. rements.
The holding cost rate is derived from:
a. Investment charge: charge for funds invested. This
is considered an interest rate. Also, the cost of
postponed benefits.
b. Forecast error and obsolescence: losses due
to generation of excess, advancements in technology,
etc.
c. Inventory losses: Adjustments to inventory caused by
accounting or physical losses and deterioration.
d. Storage cost: costs related to storage of material.
Thus holding costs include such factors as obsolescence,
interest on capital, losses, handling and storage
facilities. [13:8; 14:3; 15:1; 12]
The EOQ calculations used for the centrally managed
supply items of the various ICPs within the Services
result from the policies established by DOD I 4140.39. These
policies affect not only the total inventory on hand, but
also the total carrying costs incurred as well as the
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backorders experienced by the customers. The EOQ equation
is the tool used by SPCC IMs to conpute their reorder points
and reorder quantities. The quantity derived from the EOQ
equation provides the most economical quantity to order at
one time [ 1 A : 3
]
The primary use of cost-to-order and cost-to-hold is in
the calculation of the optimum order size— one which will
result in the least total supply cost. The size of such an
order is known as an economic order quantity, or EOQ, If the
order size is either less than or greater than the EOQ,
actual total holding and ordering costs will be greater than
the minimum attainable total cost. [15:3]
Under the EOQ model, the order quantity is selected such
that the ordering costs are about equal to the holding costs.
If the order size is larger than the optimum, fewer orders
will be submitted, resulting in lo\Hrer ordering costs. But
the larger order size will produce larger inventory levels,
and the increase in holding costs will exceed the savings in
ordering costs. Conversely, if the order size is smaller
than the optimum, the increase in ordering costs will exceed
the savings in holding costs. [16:3]
Item management is done at SPCC and ASO for the Navy.
transaction information about an item is provided to the UICP
computer each time a transaction involving that item occurs.
UICP then determines the status of the inventory. When the
43
stock level of the item reaches a designated minimum value, a
buy quantity is calculated, using the EOQ equation discussed
in Chapter III, and the desired quantity is ordered. The
basic EOQ computation is similar to the V/ilson Lot-Size
formula; however derivation of the factors that make-up the
formula does vary.
A noticeable difference exists in the calculation of the
holding cost between the government and the private sector.
Industry normally computes holding cost as a set percentage
of the cost of the on -hand inventory for each item in their
inventory, while the Navy computes it as a percentage of the
total cost of the inventory system. The holding cost and
the factors that make up the holding cost are expressed as a
percentage of the total cost of the items. The holding cost
is a consolidation of the various cost factors required
to maintain a certain stock level of items.
DOD has presently established constant rates for
opportunity cost (interest rate) and storage cost of 10% and
1% respectively. The factors of obsolescence and loss are
costs calculated separately by each Service. The obsolescence
factor is included in the computation of EOQ as a damper to
decrease the order quantity on items that are becomming
obsolete before they can be issued for use. [6:3-24; 14:5]
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B. HOLDING COST COMPONENTS
Circa 1959 Harbridge House developed the holding and
ordering cost used to calculate order frequency and the
reorder points under EOQ. The holding cost thus developed
is a yearly rate which is applied to the dollar value of
items stocked. The higher the holding cost rate, the lower
the quantity of stock desired to have in inventory. [16:3]
The current Navy holding cost rates are (consumables -














These holding cost rates are currently used by the IMs and
SPCC in the determination of economic order quantities. But
holding costs rates are only estimates which are based upon
separate cost components - general storage cost, deteriora-
tion, obsolescence, losses in storage, and interest. DOD
has specified the rates themselves or techniques to determine
the rates at the wholesale level for each component of the
holding cost r a te. [ 1 5 : 6-7 ; 8:5]
45
C. HOLDING COSTS ELEMENTS
Within DOD's various economic order systens, holding
costs represent <a]. 1 variable costs which can be directly
attributed to maintaining a given average dollar value of
inventory against requirements at any distribution point
over a fixed period of time, normally a year. Holding costs
therefore consist of the following major elements; (1)
storage, (2) interest, (3) losses, and (4) obsolescence.
1 , Storage
Under DODI 41^0.39, storage costs have been assessed
at one percent (1%) of an item's purchase price. Storage
costs represent the out-of-pocket costs incurred by the
keeping of an inventory and the amortized cost of the storage
facilities. DOD arrives at this rate by identifying the
various storage operations and obtaining cost estimates for
them. The total annual operating cost is divided by the
average inventory to yield the 1% holding cost rate decreed
by DOD. [17:10]
Storage operations at NSCs and NSDs include activi-
ties conducted by the Stock Control Division, the Storage
Division, the Inspection Office, and the Transportation
Office. Storage operations include all those activities
involved in the storage of and issue of supplies from the
time the material is placed in storage until it is picked
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for issue to consumes. The following can be classified
as storage operations:
a. initial preparation and processing of supplies for
s torage ;
b. repackaging or reprocessing of items received (when
necessary due to improper or defective packaging);
c. cyclical inspection of supplies in storage;
d. periodic movement or manipulation of items to prevent
deteriora t ion
;
e. preparation for inventory and the maintenance of the
stock record accounts;
f. periodic physical inventorying if stocks;
g. miscellaneous activities, such as re warehousing and
cleaning and repair of storage facilities. I^IS; 44-46;
79]
The following three elements are relevant to the
costing of storage operations:
- direct labor and materials, the costs of civilian and
military labor, support supplies and materials, travel
and other contractual expenses;
- direct overhead, which consists of administrative and
other expenses which are not allocated directly to using
activities (accrued leave, government contributions to
retirement funds, and group life insurance);
- equipment amortization, repairs, utilities, and
depreciation of the physical plant (material handling
equipment (ME), office equipment). [18:46]
2 . Interest
DODI 4140.11 lists interest as a portion of the
holding cost rate. Currently the annual interest costs
related to the funds committed to inventories have been
assessed at ten percent (10%) of an item's purchase price.
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Each dollar of public funds which is invested in DOD
inventory represents a dollar of investment in the private
sector which is foregone. The interest cost included as a
component of holding cost represents the opportunity cost of
investment in inventory assets. interest costs are
therefore an important consideration when inventory is to be
acquired since a measure of opportunity cost should be
included in the decision to purchase this inventory.
3 . Physical Inventory Adjustments
While price changes are used in private industry as
part of holding costs, they are not part of the computation
of DOD holding costs. When inventory losses or gains are
found to exist at the time of physical inventory, the inven-
tory losses are a legitimate cost of holding stocks provided
they are set off against the inventory increasesre suiting
from the gains discovered during the physical inventory.
The new losses computed in this manner represent the costs
of deterioration, breakage and spoilage, pilferage and other
losses to inventory in storage. [18:83]
A . Obsolescence
The costs attributable to obsolescence are the sum
of the loss of the original value of the inventory, plus
its allocable share of the cost of disposal operations, less
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any return realized from disposal action. This total
cost constitutes the obsolescence element of the holding
cost rate
.
The decision to carry stock at a given inventory
level is based on the belief that repetitive demand will be
sufficient to exhaust stocks currently being held. However,
if the item becomes obsolete because a better item has been
procured, or if the item becomes obsolete because a better
item has been procured, or if force levels or end items
densities decrease, then part or all of the inventory
stocked in anticipation of future demand will become excess
to the current demand. Thus the money invested in the excess
stock, together with the cost of removing it from the supply
system, is chargeable as a cost of holding stock. The
obsolescent portion of holding cost is based on the actual
costs of generating and disposing of excess quantities of
stock material against given inventory levels. [18:48]
D. EXCESS MATERIAL
The decision to carry stocks at a given inventory level
is generally based on the assumption that future demands
will continue at a given rate. However, if the demand drops
off unexpectedly much of the stock carried in anticipation
of a continued high level of demand will become excess or
long-supply material.
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One of the major factors to be considered in analyzing
the retention of material in long-supply or excess is the
cost to hold the item. DOD activities review requirements
and on-hand assets periodically to determine if they hav'2
excess assets. Assets above requirements are reported to
the inventory manager as either total or partial excess in
accordance with levels described in DOD Directive 4100.37
[19:7]
Upon receiving a excess report from a reporting activity,
the IM compares wholesale requirements and may authorize a
return to wholesale stock to fill deficiencies. disposition
instructions are made authorizing return for credit', return
without credit, or disposal. Upon receipt of disposition
instruction the reporting activity either returns the ma-
terial to a wholesale depot, or turns the material over to
property disposal. [19:78] However, within the Navy
material is returned to wholesale supply depots before the
IM can issue disposition instruction. The usual procedure
is to place the material in stock and tlien report the
receipt to the IM. Although the IM may not have any
forecasted demands, the receipt and storage expenses have
already been incurred by the time the IM receives the
report. The item manager's decision, whether to retain or
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dispose of the excess material, is thus complicated by the
fact that funds have already been expended in bringing the
item back into inventory.
The net cost of disposal must be ascertained as a
basis for reaching a decision about disposal. Two factors
are required to determine the net cost of disposal; the
disposal cost per line item and the potential benefit (item
usable at a future date) plus the sale proceeds of the
remaining material. Each of these factors is affected by
the number and value of line items processed for disposal,
and these factors are further influenced by the disposal
process itself which converts excess supply material into
disposal line items. [19:79]
Typically the holding costs of the available units are
compared with the costs of repurchasing new items at a later
date. If holding costs are higher than repurchase costs for
units that would be used at some future date, these units
are considered disposable, if not, they are considered to be
economically retainable.
Inventory control models such as the Economic Order
Quantity (EOQ) model indicate the minimum quantity of an item
to be acquired. They do not provide information concerning
item quantities to maintain in inventory in the face of
changing demands or technological obsolescence, or deleted
requirements. Economic retention quantities are defined in
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DODI 4140-37 as those quantities of material which it is
more economical to retain for future use than to transfer to
disposal activities. [17:2]
Thus the purpose of economic retention is to determine
which is more economical: to retain or to dispose and
reprocure at a later date. The components of the holding
cost rate--storage costs, interest costs, and obsolescence
costs (which include inventory depletion due to losses and
deterioration) need to be considered.
In a retention situation, storage costs assessed at 1%
are incurred if an item is retained in inventory and
therefore is included as part of inventory holding costs of
retention. [17:10]
The annual interest costs related to the funds committed
to inventories are assessed at ten percent (10%) of an
item's purchase price. A decision to retain an item in
inventory does not require additional investments of public
funds for purchase of inventory assets. However, the
decision to retain an item in inventory precludes the
salvage of that item and represents an opportunity cost
associated with the salvage value of the item. [17:11]
Obsolescence costs include losses due to technological
obsolescence, over-forecasting of requirements, deteriora-
tion beyond the point of use, and otiier causes. The
obsolescence cost rate is arrived at by dividing the actual
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dollar value of disposed material by the total dollar value
of on-hand inventory assets. In a retention situation, the
decision involves retaining inventory items that have
already been purchased rather than purchasing new items.
However, the salvage value which can be obtained from an
item may be lost if the item is retained and subsequently
becomes obsolete. [17:12]
If a quantify of items above the computed requirements
is retained, inventory holding costs are incurred:
Cost to Hold = Storage cost + obsolescence cost of the
items to replace those lost to obsolescence
T Opportunity cost of salvage value fore-
gone by retaining the items.
Under the economic retention level model, when the cost
to order is greater than the cost to hold - retain the
material in inventory to meet future demand. When the cost
to order is less than the cost to hold - dispose of the
material. The economic retention level model is designed
only to serve as an aid to management decision making. It is
not designed to make inventory management decision. Rather
the item manager must decide, aided by the model, the feasi-
bility of maintaining items in inventory for future demand or




The varied categories which combine the holding cost
rate ar e
:
1. Interest on dollars invested
2. Applicable Stock Control and Financial Control
elements at tlie ICPs





6. Deterioration and Shrinkage (Physical inventory
adjustment and excess)
7 Obsolescence.
The holding cost rate or the cost-to-hold is applied to on-
hand inventory. Errors in lead time estimation lead to
errors of overestimation which will result in an excess of
on-hand inventory that must be retained or disposed of, to
which holding costs are applied. Errors of underestimation
result in a deficiency of on-hand assets and can have a
damaging effect on operational readiness. [20:43]
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V. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. STOCK REPLENISHMENT
spec's Contracts Completed File was used as a source of
data for this thesis. This database contains approximately
14,000 records of procurement actions which were completed
before the required delivery date (RDD). The RDD is the
contract completion date. In the Contracts Completed File
records of completed contracts are kept for three years
before they are purged from the data base. A listing of
2,500 early deliveries was generated from the data for the
most recent year. THis listing contained purchase orders,
delivery orders, and "C" type contracts. Since the research
effort concentrated on replenishment of inventories, the
database was queried for all "C" type contracts completed
before RDD. A computer listing with a cut-off of 25 August
1986 (Appendix B) with 545 contracts was generated. These
contracts accounted for 3.84% of all contracts contained
within the database. This computer listing was then used as
source data for the thesis.
The database showed no concentration within any part-
icular group of inventory managers. The IMs ranged across
some 200 difference codes distributed throughout the Weapon
Systems Support Group: Ships Systems, Combat Systems, and
Electronic Systems Departments. The material ranged from
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headsets, seals, pumps and valves, to circuit cards and
antenna. The material delivered early covered the full
range of material managed by SPCC.
Of the 545 contracts delivered early, 246 were completed
more than 60 days early. Contracts delivered within 60 days
of the RDD were not considered to be significantly early.
The 246 contracts had a total value of $22,865,636. They
were broken out as follows:








































































Cost to hold is determined by using the center value of
Days Early divided by 365 days times the holding rate
(23%) times the Value (i.e., 15/365 x .23 x 9,594,783 =
90,690).
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The data shows that there are early deliveries, but they
must be placed in perspective to the total number of
procurement actions and dollars processed at SPCC.










TOTAL $4.17 Billion $1,088.9 Million 8,032
For the fiscal years of 1984, 1985 and 1986 there were a
total of 8,032 "C'type contracts worth $1.09 billion issued.
Of this total, 545 contracts worth $43,398,262 were
completed before RDD, with 246 contracts worth $22,865,636
completed mora than 60 days prior to the required delivery
date. When a holding cost rate of 23% is applied to the
early deliveries a sura of $2.47 million is generated for the
deliveries earlier than 60 days, and a sura of $2.87 million
for all 545 contracts. Consequently, the opportunity cost
of early deliveries is approxiinately $2.47 million. This
sum was spent on inventories that were not required in the
amount originally requested because of faulty lead times in
their requirements computation. These funds could have been
better used elsewhere. Thus the opportunity cost lies
between $2.47 and $2.87 million. They could have been used
to procure material not funded, or they could have been
used to procure an increased number of critical items.
Since the database represents a 3 year period, the $2.47
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million represents .227% of the "C" type contract
procurement dollars spent for stock replenishment at SPCC.
Early deliveries account for (246 / 8032 = .0306) 3.06% of
the total "C" type procurement actions for the same period.
Total "C" type contracts valued at $1,089 million represent
(1089 / 4010 = .27) 27% of the total dollars spent by SPCC.
Shelf-life materials are an area of primary concern v/hen
considering the consequences of the early delivery of
material. None of the 246 contracts delivered early were
for the procurement of shelf-life items. Only two contracts
for shelf-life material appeared on the listing, and they
were delivered 2 days and 48 days ahead of the RDD.
The data revealed no specific pattern of companies or
industries which delivered their products consistently
early. There were 167 different contractors who delivered
246 contracts early, and the total collection of 545
contracts involved 341 contractors.
From the 246 contracts delivered early at SPCC, the
staff code 0502 Weapon System Program Support performed an
in-depth review of 27 selected contracts which v^here
delivered 100 days before RDD and valued at over $100 K
each .
Initially, of the 27 items reviewed, four (4) where
identified as candidates for long supply. They were "due-
in" long supply as opposed to on-hand long supply. However,
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upon review by the I Ms only one was due-in long supply. The
remaining three items were not due-in long supply once the
I Ms had properly loaded all requirements into UICP. There
were no excess inventories created by the early deliveries.
Additionally, all items were non-deteriorative in nature (not
shelf-life limited). The 27 line items were managed by 24
item managers scattered throughout three departments in the
Weapon Systems Support Group: Ships Systems Department,
Combat Systems Department and Electronic Systems Department.
There were no unusual concentrations in any one department.
The contracts were with 27 different companies.
The 27 items were all true early deliveries. The item
managers had taken no action to expedite the delivery of any
of the material. As far as the IMs were concerned they
would be just as happy to have everything come in ahead of
RDD. They were all routine replenishment requirements
requiring no special attention by the IMs.
Whether an item is awarded competitively or through
negotiation has little bearing on early delivery. Of the 27
items: 12 were awarded competitively and 15 were the result
of negotiations. Procurement personnel for routine stock
replenishment do not normally negotiate the delivery
schedule. The normal practice is to use the UICP generated
leadtime to compute a required delivery date which is placed
in the solicitation that is sent to prospective offerors.
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There is little or no incentive for the contractor to agree
to a shortened delivery schedule.
B. ITEM MANAGERS
No item manager perceived the early delivery or receipt
of supplies/material before the required delivery date as a
problem. Early deliveries have a positive connotation to
them. IM's believe that contractors who deliver early are
good, while late delivering contractors are bad even though
in some instances they are the same contractor. If material
is delivered early the IM won't have to worry about the
inventory position of the item. The IM will not have to
expedite an order for the material at some future date.
Since none of the material had generated on-hand long
supplies, they also didn't have to face the problem of
having to decide if excess material existed and whether it
should be disposed of or kept. the IM faces more
significant daily problems and is therefore not \^/orried
about material received before RDD.
The item managers could not identify any instance where
the early delivery of material had caused them a problem.
They had had unexpected deliveries that had caused problems,
but not early deliveries. Unexpected deliveries occur when
the stock point is unaware of material due in to their
activity because they did not receive a preposition material
card. They had had no long supply or excess problems caused
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by early deliveries. They had no limited shelf-life
material delivered ahead of schedule that had caused
problems .
According to the I^Is, under normal circumstances the early
delivery of material should not cause excess or long-supply.
When the system computes requirements it considers total
assets, both on- hand and due-in. Therefore, an item would
have to have been in due-in long supply prior to going into
on-hand long supply. And the item managers do not view due-
in long supply as a serious problem.
C. THE COMPANY WHO DELIVERS EARLY
Unrealistically long required delivery dates (RDD) are
the primary reason that companies deliver material ahead of
RDD. In competitive situations companies normally bid to the
RDD. However if the solicitation does present the oppor-
tunity to offer an earlier date, some prospective contrac-
tors will propose an earlier delivery schedule. But those
the researcher interviewed stated that few solicitations
provide a desired and a required delivery date format.
Rather most solicitations provide a desired and a required
delivery date format. Rather most solicitations normally
have only a required delivery date. Some contractors stated
that they simply respond to the RDD to be competitive,
whether it is realistic or not and then produce the items as
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best they can, attefiipting to satisfy the delivery schedule
but not feeling undue pressure to meet it. This results in
some early and some delinquent contracts.
Negotiated (sols source) and competitive solicitations
are handled differently by the prospective contractors. In
negotiated contracts the contractors stated that they would
inform the contracting officer if they felt the RDD was
unrealistic and that they may propose an alternative
delivery schedule. Many companies are following a conserva-
tive approach in quoting delivery schedules so that they
will not end up being labeled a delinquent contractor.
Under normal circumstances the delivery schedule for routine
stock procurements are not directly addressed during
negotiations. Cost is the prime concern in negotiations.
The fear of being declared non-responsive prevents many
contractors from taking exception to the proposed delivery
schedules. In order to get the business the prospective
contractors will make an offer based upon the schedule even
if it is shorter than their normal leadtimes and tlien
attempt to meet the delivery date. Most companies \\rho deal
on a routine basis with the military have developed their
own standard leadtimes which they use when responding to
government solicitations. These have grown longer and
become more conservative as increasing pressure has been
brought by DOD on companies who deliver late.
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Those companies with high debt and low cash flow have a
strong incentive to deliver whatever they can as soon as
possible. One company stated that they were is just that
position .
Another company stated that because of their conserva-
tive quoting policy they estimated they deliver about 10% of
their contracts early and about 50% on time. The rest, even
with conservative leadtimes, were being delivered late
because of the need to make offers on solicitations which
contain unrealistic required delivery dates as computed by
the UICP models.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Conclusion - -The early delivery of material to the
government does not cause a serious problem. There is a
cost associated with early deliveries. It is costing SPCC at
least $2.47 million for the early delivery of "C" type
contracts over a period of three years. However, in pers-
pective this is only .227% of the total value of "C" type
contracts awarded ($1.09 billion).
The Item Managers and Procurement Personnel at SPCC have
not considered early deliveries to be a problem. They are so
enmeshed in the problems associated with delinquent con-
tracts that the idea that receiving something early is or
could be bad is not a consideration. The IMs don't have to
worry about expediting the material for some future emer-
gency if a contract is delivered early. As contract manage-
ment is often in a reactive mode, no attention is directed
at early deliveries since they have not caused the customer
to complain thus focusing attention on the issue.
Conclusion--Excessive PLT causes early delivery. The
true culprit in early delivery and delinquent contracts is
the inappropriate procurement leadtimes used by UICP to
compute RDDs for stock replenishment. The use of inappro-
priate procurement leadtimes by UICP generates an ever
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higher safety stock level, reorder point and reorder
quantities for material which needlessly tie up inventory
funds. The IMs and procurement personnel normally accept
the computer generated RDDs, and he contractor prices to the
RDD and then produces the material in his best interest.
Conclusion--Shelf-life material is not being delivered
early. Only two contracts for shelf-life material appeared
on the computer listing used for this thesis, and they were
delivered 2 and 48 days ahead of RDD.
Conclusion --No company or industry delivers their
products consistently early. There were 341 contractors who
completed the 545 contracts early.
Conclusion --The contracting method employed, negotiated
(sole source) or competitive, has no bearing on early delivery
Of 27 contracts over $100 K researched indepth: 12 were
awarded competitively and 15 were the result of negotiations.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation - -Do not amend the FAR to forbid the early
delivery of material by contractors. Contract Administrators
should not have another set of rules requiring them
to monitor yet more contracts as proposed by NAVSEA in
Appendix C. They are hard pressed to manage delinquent
contracts and manage them mainly by exception. Presently
contract administrators must decide where to place their
emphasis and which contracts will receive attention. While
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early contracts have a cost attached, they do not have a
directly negative impact on fleet readiness. While they do
use scarce resources that :Tiay be better employed else .v here,
delinquent contracts have an immediate adverse affecc on
fleet /operational readiness.
The forbidding of early deliveries would send the wrong
type of message to private business. All too often we are
trying to expedite material ahead of schedule because of
changing requirements, and to now come out and say we don't
want it until the RDD would be counterproductive. This
could become another factor which further lengthens lead-
times and which would increase the size of the inventory,
raise reorder points and reorder quantities even higher.
Recommendation -- Amend the FAR to create a window of
delivery and a delivery clause for inventory replenishment.
The ultimate air of the Navy's ICPs is to get the appro-
priate material delivered to the right destination on time.
This can be accomplished by establishing realistic delivery
schedules. the government must put an end to the unrealistic
required delivery schedules generated by the UICP models for
the routine replenishment of inventory stocks. The govern-
ment must also encourage prospective contractors to submit
delivery schedules that they can realistically meet, whether
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they are earlier than or later than the proposed (desired)
delivery date.
Therefore those portions of the FAR (Part 12 and 52)
which deal with delivery schedules must be modified. The
first step would be the creation of a 60-day window around
the RDD - contracts completed within 60 days of the RDD were
not considered to have delivered on time if he delivers
within this window. The second step would be the
development of a delivery clause for routine stock
replenishment of inventories similar to that proposed in
Appendix D. This will encourage offerors to propose realist!'
delivery schedules with phased or incremental deliveries
to meet a desired delivery schedule.
In most cases the RDD established for routine stock
replenishment is not really a required delivery date
generated by a specific need, but rather it is a delivery
date based on historical data in the computer which may or
may not reflect the current situation. Changing the lead-
times will change the safety level, the reorder point and
reorder quantities thus freeing scarce funds for items
which have true long leadtimes.
Recommendation—Delivery schedules should be nego-
tiated. DOD should follow the example of private industry
and actively negotiate the delivery schedule as well as the
price with prospective contractors. SPCC currently has a
67
pilot study underway to see if the negotiation of RDD and
price are feasible in today's procurement environment.
ii
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
What effect does the early delivery of material have on
managements ability to control expenditures? There is no
effect on managements ability to control expenditures. The
costs involved accounted for only .227% of total funds
expended .
Are early deliveries an extensive problem with certain
industries or products? There is no industry or company
which consistently delivers early. There are no particular
products which are delivered consistently early.
What are the positive and negative affects on DOD's
ability to manage inventories? The early delivery of
material does not affect DOD ' s ability to manage
inventories. The early deliveries account for only 3.06% of
the total "C" type contracts issued.
Would contract clauses specifying window delivery
schedules be an effective means of dealing with early
delivery? The creation of window delivery schedules is one
ai.-ans of dealing with early deliveries.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research in the area of early deliveries should
be directed towards the Defense Logistic Agencies and
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General Adninistrative Services. Their material may be more
susceptible to early deliveries than Navy managed materials.
Further research should be conducted in the area of
the early delivery of sole source nagotiatad materials.
Further research should be conducted in the relationship
between early delivery and procurement leadtiraes.
E. .SUMMARY
In summary, early deliveries do occur. There are no
shelf-life problems at SPCC associated with early delivery.
There are opportunity costs incurred in the holding and
paying for material delivered early. The true culprit in
early deliveries are inappropriate procurement leadtimes
used by the ICPs in computing in RDDs for stock replenishment





NAVSEA PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE FAR
This appendix contains NAVSEA's recommendations for
araraending the FAR Part 12 and 52 to prohibit the early
delivery of material and services specifically allowed in
thecontract.
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12.10^ IS anenaed by aiiinc tne following:
(ii) The ccntractiTig officer shall insert in solicitations ani contracts for
supplies or services a clause substantially the same as the clause at
52.212-xx, Accelerated Deliveries of Supplies ani Services. The clause
peraits accelerated deliveries under tne contract for only those supplies or
services specifically enumerate: within the clause.
Part 52 - SOLICITATION PROVISION'S and CONTRACT CLAUSES
52.212 is amended by adding the following:
52.212-xx Accelerated Deliveries of Supplies and Services.
As prescribed by FAR 12.1014(H), the contracting officer shall cortplete and
insert a clause substantially as follows in solicitations and contracts for
supplies or services. The clause invokes certain prohibitions against the
1 early delivery cf supplies or services.
ACCELERATED DELIVERIES
OF SUPPLIES OR SERVICES
(a) Supplies/Services tendered for acceptance fifteen calendar days or core
prior to the contract delivery date will be processed at the discretion of the
contracting officer using one of the procedures provided below, except for
those supplies/services enumerated in (b) which may be delivered at any tine
prior to the delivery date.
1. Supplies/Services will not be accepted if tendered at origin or if
acceptance is at destination they may be returned by the government at
contractors expense.
2. Supplies/Services will be accepted but invoices will not be processed for
payment until after the contract delivery date. Tne government will still be
entitled to any proz,pX. payment terms offered by the contractor for those
supplies/services accepted early. The prompt payment tern period shall begin
from the contract delivery date or receipt of an acceptable invoice which ever
is later.
3. Supplies/Services will be accepted and the government will deduct from the
contractors invoice, in addition to any other terms offered, the Current
Treasury Interest Rate for 6 month bills. Tne contract will be modified to
reflect these deductions.
(b) Accelerated deliveries under this contract may be made only for those
items listed below.
Item Qty Delivery Date Snip To Kark For
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APPENDIX B
CONTRACTS COMPLETED BEFORE RDD
The 545 contracts contained in this appendix form the
database for this thesis. It is a computer listing of ^C'
type contracts from the Contracts Completed File at SPCC
that were completed before RDD. The following information
is contained in the listings:
1. PUN: The contract number.
2. NUN: Last nine digits of the National Stock Number
purchased under the contract.
3. PURCH DATE: Date (year and number of days) of the
award of the contract.
4. RDD: Required Delivery Date.
5. CONT. COMP: Date (year and number of days) contract
completed .
6. EXT DOL: Dollar value of the contract.
7. FSCM:. Manufactures code of the contractor.
8. LRC : Inventory managers code at SPCC.
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12.000 Scope of part.
This pan prescnbes policies and procedures relating
to delivery or performance under cor^tracts for sud-
plics, sennces, and construction.
SUBPART 12.:—DELrVTHY OR PERFORNUNCE
SCHEDULES
12.101 GeneniL
(a) The umc of delivery or performance is an essen-
tial contract element and shail be clearly sutcd m so-
licitauons. ODntractmg otTicers shall ensure that deliv-
ery or performance schedules are realistic and meet the
requirements of the acquisition. Schedules that are un-
reasonably ught or difficult of attainment (I) tend to
, restrict competition, (2) are inconsistent with small
j business policies, and (3) may result in higher contract
' prices.
(b) Solicitations shall, e.Tcept when clearly unneces-
sary, inform bidders or otTerors of the basis on which
their bids or proposals will be evaluated with respect
to time of delivery or performance.
(c) If timely delivery or performance is unusually
important !o the Government. liquidated damages
clauses may be used (see Subpart 12.2).
12.102 Factors to consider in establishing schedules,
(a) Supplies or services. When establishing a contract
delivery or performance schedule, consideration shall
be given to applicable factors such as the
—





(6) Capabilities of small business concerns;
(7) Administrative time for obtaining and evaluat-
ing offers and for awarding contracts;
(8) Time for contractors to comply with any con-
ditions precedent to contract performance: and
(9) Time for the Government to perform its obli-
gations under the contract; e.g., furnishing Govern-
ment property.
J
fb) Construcaon. When scheduling the time for com-
pletion of a construction contract, the contracting otTi-
cer shall consider applicable factors such as the
—
(1) Nature and complexity of the project;
(2) Construction seasons involved;
(3) Required completion date;
(•*) Availability of materials and equipment;
(5) Capacity of the contractor to perform: and
C6) Use of multiple completion dates. (In any given
contract, separate completion dates may be estab-
lished for separable items o( work. When multiple
completion dates are used, requests for extension ox
time must be evaluated 'Anth respect to each item,
and the aiTected completion dates modii'ied when
appropnate.i
12.103 Supplies or serrices.
(a) The contracting olTiccr may express* contract de-
livery or penbrmance schedules m terms of
—
(1) Specific calendar dates;
(2) Specific penods from the date of the contract;
i.e., from the date of award or acceptance by the
Government, or from the date shown as the effective
date of the contract;
(3) Specific penods from the date of receipt by the
contractor of the nouce of award or acceptance by
the Government (including nouce by receipt of con-
tract document executed by the Government); or
(4) Specific ume for delivery after receipt by the
contractor of each individual order issued under the
contract, as m indellnite delivery type contracts and
GSA schedules.
(b) The time specified for contract pcrfcr.mahce
should not be curtailed to the prejudice of the contrac-
tor because of delay by the Government m givmg
notice of award.
(c) If the delivery schedule is based on the date of
the contract, the contracting oiTicer shall mail or other-
wise furnish to the contractor the contract, nouce of
award, acceptance of proposal, or other contract docu-
ment not later than the date of the contract
(d) If the delivery schedule is based on the date the
contractor receives the notice of award, or if the deliv-
ery schedule is expressed m terms of specific calendar
dates on the assumption that the notice of award will
be received by a specified date, the contracting otTicer
shall send the contract, notice of award, acceptance of
proposal, or other contract document by ceniUed mail,
return receipt requested, or by any other method that
will provide evidence of the date of receipt
(e) In invitations for bids, if the delivery schedule is
based on the date of the contract, and a bid olTers
delivery based on the date the contractor receives the
contract or notice of award, the contracung officer
12-1
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shall evaluate the bid by adding 5 days ^as representing
the normal time for arnvai through ordinary maill If
the offered delivery date computed with mailing time li
;ater than the delivery date reauired 5v ;he invitation
for bids, the bid shall be consiaered noaresponsive and
rejected. If award :s mace, tne delivery date will be the
number of days offered in the bid after the contractor
actually receives the notice of award.
12.104 Contract clauses.
(a) Supplies or services. (1) The contracting officer
may use a time of delivery clause to set forth a re-
quired delivery schedule and to allow an offeror to
propose an alternative delivery schedule. The clauses
and their alternates may be used in solicitations and
contracts suostantially as shown, they may be cnanged.
or new clauses may be wntten.
(2) The contracting ofTicer may insert in solicita-
tions and contracts for supplies or services a clause
substantially the same as the clause a: 52.212-1. Time
of Delivery, if the Government requires delivery by
a particular time and the delivery schedule is to be
based on the date of the contract. If the delivery
schedule is e.xpresscd in terms of specific calendar
dates or specific penods and is based on an assumed
date of award, the contracting officer may use the
clause with its Alternate I. If the delivery schedule is
expressed in terms of specific calendar dales or spe-
afic penods and is based on an assumed date the
contractor will receive notice of award, the contract-
ing officer may use the clause with its Alternate II.
If the delivery schedule is to be based on the actual
date the contractor receives a wntten notice of
award, the contracting officer may use the clause
with Its Alternate III.
(3) The contracting officer may insert in solicita-
tions and contracts for supplies or services a clause
substantially the same as the clause at 52.212-2. De-
sired and Required Time of Delivery, if the Govern-
ment desires delivery by a certain time but requires
delivery by a specified later time, and the delivery
schedule is to be based on the date of the contract. If
the delivery schedule is expressed in terms of specific
calendar dales or specific penods and is based on an
assumed date of award, the contracting officer may
use tne clause with its Alternate I. If the delivery
schedule is e.xpressed in terms of specific calendar
dates or specific penods and is based on an assumed
date the contractor will receive nonce of award, the
contracting officer may use the clause with its Alter-
nate II. If the delivery schedule is to be based on the
actual date the contractor receives a wntten notice
of award, the contracting officer may use the clause
with Its Alternate III.
(b) Construction. The contracting officer shall insen
the clause at 52.212-3. Commencement. Prosecution,
and Completion of Work, in solicitations and contracts
when a fued-price construction contract is contemplat-
ed. The clause may be changed to accommodate the
issuance of orders unaer indetlnite-delivery contracts.
If the completion date is e.xpresscd as a specific calen-
dar date, computed en the basis of the contractor re-
ceiving the notice to proceea 3y i certain day, the
contracting officer may use the clause w-itn its Alter-
nate I.
52.212-1 Time of Deiiyeo-.
As prescnbcd in 12. 104<aK2). the contracting otTiccr
may insert a clause substantially as follows in solicita-
tions and contracts for supplies or services A' the Gov-
ernment requires delivery by a particular time and the
delivery schedule is to be based on the date of the
contract:
TIME OF DELIVERY (APR 1984)
(a) The Government requires delivery to be made
according to the following schedule:
REQUIRED DELIVERY SCHEDULE





The Government will evaluate eoually. as regards
time of delivery, offers that propose delivery of each
quantity within the applicable delivery penod specified
above. Offers ihat propose delivery that will not clear-
K fall wiihin the applicable required delivery period
specified above, will be considered nonresponsive and
rejected The Government reserves the right to award
under either the required delivery schedule or the pro-
po<.ed delivery schedule, when an offeror offers an
earlier delivery schedule than required above. If the
iilferor proposes no other delivery schedule, the re-
quired deii\ery schedule above will apply.
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(b) Attention is directed to the Contract Award pro-
vision of the solicitation that provides that a wntten
award or acceptance of offer mailed, or otherwise fur-
nished to the successful offeror, results in a binding
contract. Tne Government will mail or otherwise fur-
nish to the offeror an award or notice of award not
later than the day award is dated. Therefore, the of-
feror should compute the time available for perform-
ance beginning with the actual date of award, rather
than the date the wntten notice of award is received
from the Contracting Officer through the ordinary'
mails. However, the Government will evaluate an oiTer
that proposes delivery based on the Contractor's date
of receipt of the contract or notice of award by adding
five days for delivery of the award through the ordi-
nary mails. If. ai so computed, the offered delivery
date is later than the required delivery date, the offer
will be considered nonresponsive and reject^.
(End of clause)
(R 7-IW. 92(b) 1974 APR)
(R 1-1.316-5)
(R l-1.316-4(c))
Alternate I (APR 1984i. If the delivery schedule is
expressed in terms of specific calendar dates or specific
penods and is based on an assumed date of award, the
contracting officer may substitute the following para-
graph (b) for paragraph (b) of the basic clause. The
time may be expressed by substituting "on or before";
"during the months ..."; or "not sooner than ... or later
than ..." as headings for the third column of paragraph
(a) the basic clause.
(b) The delivery dates or specific penods above are
based on the assumption that the Government will
make award by [Contracting Officer insert
date]. Each delivery date in the delivery schedule
above will be extended by the. number of calendar days
after the above date that the contract is in fact award-
ed. Attention is directed to the Contract Award provi-
sion of the solicitation that provides thai a written
award or acceptance of offer mailed or otherwise fur-
nished to the successful offeror results in a binding
contract. Therefore, the offeror should compute the
time available for performance beginning with the
actual date of award, rather than the dale the wniien
notice of award is received from the Contracting Offi-
cer through the ordinary mails.
(R 7-104. 92(e) 1974 APR)
(R I-1.316-4(b)(l))
Alternate If (APR 1984). If the delivery schedule is
expressed in terms of specific calendar dates or specific
penods and is based on an assumed date the contractor
will receive notice of award, the contracting oiTicer
may substitute the following paragraph (b) for para-
graph (b) of the basic clause. The time may be ex-
pressed by substituting "within days after the date of
receipt of a wntten notice of award" as the heading for
the third column o{ paragraph (ai of the basic clause.
(b) The delivery dates or specific penods above are
based on the assumption that the successful offeror will
receive notice of award by [Contracting Officer
insert date]. Each delivery date m the delivery schedule
above will be extended by the number of calendar days
after the above date that the Contractor receives notice
of award; provided, that the Contractor promptly ac-
knowledges receipt of notice of award.
(R 7- 104.92(e)(2) 1974 APR)
(R 1.1.316-4fb)(2))
Alternate III (APR 1984). If the delivery schedule is
to be based on the actual date the contractor receives a
wntten notice of award, the contracting officer may
delete paragraph (b) of the basic clause. The ume may
be expressed by substituting "within days after the date
of receipt of a wntten notice of award" as the heading
for the third column of paragraph (a) of the basic
clause.
52.212-2 I>esired and Required Time of Delivery.
As prescnbcd in 12.104<a)(3), the contracting officer
may insen a clause substantially as follows m solicita-
tions and contracts for supplies or services if the Gov-
ernment desires delivery by a certain time, but requires
delivery by a specified later time, and the delivery
schedule is to be based on the date of the contract:
DESIRED AND REQUIRED TIME OF
DELIVERY (APR 1984)
(a) The Government desires delivery to be made
according to the following schedule:
DESIRED DELIVERY SCHEDULE





If the offeror is unable to meet the desired delivery
schedule, it may. without prejudicing evaluation of its
offer, propose a delivery schedule below However, the
offeror's proposed delivery schedule must not exiend
the delivery penod beyond the time for delivery in the
Governments required delivery schedule as follows:
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REQUIRED DELIVERY SCHEDULE





OfTers that propose delivery of a quantity under such
terms or conditions that delivery will not clearly fall
within the applicable required delivery penod specified
above, will be considered nonresponsive and rejected.
If the offeror proposes no other delivery schedule, the
desired delivery schedule above will apply.





(b) Attention is directed to the Contract Award pro-
vision of the soliciution that provides that a written
award or acceptance of offer mailed or otherwise fur-
nished to the successful offeror results in a binding
contract. The Government will mail or otherwise fur-
nish to the offeror an award or notice of award not
later than the day the award is dated. Therefore, the
offeror shall compute the time available for perform-
ance beginning with the actual date of award, rather
than the date the wntten notice of award is received
from the Contracting Officer through the ordinary
mails. However, the Government will evaluate an offer
that proposes delivery based on the Contractor's date
of receipt of the contract or notice of award by adding
five days for delivery of the award through the ordi-
nary mails. If. as so computed, the offered delivery
date IS later than the required delivery dale, the the
offer will be considered nonresponsive and rejected.
(End of clause)
(R 7.104.92(c) 1974 APR)
(R 1-1.316-5(0)
(R 1-1.316-4(0))
Ahernate 1 (APR 1984). If the delivery schedule is
expressed in terms of specific calendar dates or specific
periods and is based on an assumed date of a\^ard. ihe
contracting officer may substitute the following para-
graph (b) for paragraph (b) of the basic clause. The
time may be expressed by substituting "on or before":
"during the months
. .
."; or "not sooner than .... or
later than ..." as headings for the third column of
paragraph (a) of (he basic clause.
(b) The delivery dates or specific periods atxive are
based on the assumption thai the Government will
make award by [Coniraciing Officer insert
dale]. Each delivery date in the delivery schedule
above will be extended by the number of calendar days
after the above daie that the contract is in fact award-
ed. Attention is Qirected to the Contract Award provi-
sion of the solicitation that provides that a written
award or acceptance of offer mailed or otherwise fur-
nished to the successful offeror results in a binding
contract. TTierefore. the offeror shall compute the time
available for performance beginning with the actual
date of award, rather than the date the wntten notice
of award is received from the Contracting OfTicer
through the ordinary mails.
(R 7-104. 92(e) 1974 APR)
(R l-1.316-4<b)(l))
Alternate II (APR 1984). If the deliver.' schedule is
expressed in terms of specific calendar dates or sfjecific
penods and is based on an assumed date tnc contractor
receives notice of award, the contracting otTicer may
substitute the following paragraph fb) for paragraph (b)
of the basic clause. The ume iivay be expressed by
substituting "within days after the date of receipt of a
wntten notice of award" as the heading of the third
column of paragraph (a) of the basic clause.
fb) The delivery dates or specific penods above are
based on the assumption that the successful offeror will
receive notice of award by [Contracting Officer
insert date]. Each delivery date in the delivery schedule
above will be extended by the number of calendar days
after the above date that the Contractor receives notice
of award; provided, that the Contractor promptly ac-
knowledges receipt of notice of award.
(R 7-104. 92(e)(:) 1974 APR)
(R 1-1.3 16-4fb)(2))
Aliernaie III (APR 1984). If the delivery schedule is
to be based on the actual date the contractor receives a
wntten notice of award, the contracting officer may
delete paragraph (b) of the basic clause. T^e time may
be expressed by substituting "within days after the dale
of receipt of a wntten notice of award" as the heading
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Carelli, F. R., Supply /Financial Systems Branch, Code 042212,
Systems Development Department, Ships Parts Control Center,
Mechanicsbur g , PA.
Cline, R. A ., Procurement Analyst, Code 0201.5. Contracting
Department, Ships Parts Control Center, Mechanicsbur g, PA.
Cohn, M., Sales Engineer, A&M Instruments Inc., 5 Nassau
St., Rockwell Center, Long Island, NY.
Colombi, R., Sales Engineer, Warren Pumps Inc., Bridge Ave.,
Warren, MA.
Evanko,M., Procurement Analyst, Code 0201.2, Contracting
Department, Ships Parts Control Center, Mechanics burg, PA.
Foley, G, B., CDR, Director, Electronics Contracting Div.,
Code 023, Contracting Department, Ships Parts Control
Center, Mechanicsburg, PA.
Guest, P., Special Program and Analysis Branch, Code 05021 H,
Program Support Office, Ships Parts Control Center,
Mechanicsburg, PA.
Houlihan R., Vice President, Clarck David Co., Inc., 360
Franklin St., Worcester, MA.
Pawlak, M., Marketing-Federal Government, Waukesha Eng.
Div., Dresser, Ind. Inc., 1000 W. St. Paul Ave,, P.O. Box
379, Waukesha, WI
.
Schmidt, W. G., CPP, Director, Program Support Office,
Weapons Systems Support Group, Code 0502, Ships Parts
Control Center, i'lechanicsburg, PA.
Tracy, E., LCDR , Director, Contract Management Division,
Code 025, Contracting Department, Ships Parts Control
Center, Mechanicsburg, PA.
Warner, R., Head, Contracting Staff, Code 0201, Contracting





Lee, Robert E., The Fifth Variable - The Problem of
Managing Delinquency iPx the Procurement of Stock and
I n - U s e Items . Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, March 1983.
"Federal Acquisition Regulation," Department of Defense,
Federal Acquisition Regulation, Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 1983.
3. Perry, James., Olio, John., and Giordano, Andrew.,




Bethesda, Maryland, February 1985.
4
.
Field Test of Economic Inventory Policy - Interim Cost
and Performance Results
,
Harbridge House, Inc., 11
Arlington St., Boston, Massachusetts, March 1960.
5. "Secondary Item Procurement Leadtime Study," Logistics
Systems Analysis QFC., Falls Church, Virginia, March
1984.
6 Inventory Management; A Basic Guide to Requirements
Determination in the Navy
,
NAVSUP Publication 553.
7. Carpenter, Dennis M., "Relating Expected Inventory
Backorders to Safety Stock Investment Levels," Air Force
Institute of Technology, School of Systems and
Logistics, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, September 1981.
8. Thomson, David A., "Analysis of the Critical Item
Performance of the Gardner-Dannerbring Aggregate
Inventory Model," Air Force Institute of Technology,
School of Systems and Logistics, Wright-Patterson AFB,
Ohio, September 1985.
9. Bruckner, G.A., Biaglioli, M. A., and McGuire, B. H.,
"Economic Procurement Quantities: A Study of the
Application of EIP Principles at the ICP Level," U.S.
Army Aviation Systems Command, St. Louis, Missouri,
March 1962.
10. Steinberg, Joshua, MAJ, lAF, A Technique for
Evaluating Vendor Bids For Stock Replenishmen t of a
Consumable Item
,
Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate




Davis, Allen S., "An Investigation of Selected Business
Indicators As Related to Aerospace Materials Lead time,"
Air University, Air Command and Staff College,
Maxwell, AFB , Alabama, May 1975.
Dominiak, Maryann, "Procurement Leadtime Forecasting
Analysis," U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Material Readiness
Command, Warren, Mississippi, May 1979.
13. Charleston Naval Shipyard, NB, Charleston, South
Carolina, "Covering Functional Area: Supply Manage-
ment," Naval Audit Service, Fall Church, Virginia, June
1977.
14. Carrillo, John., Peabody, Donald G., "An Empirical
Analysis of a USAF Economic Order Quantity Parameter,"
Air Force Institute of Technology, School of System and
Logistics , Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, September 1978
15. Molony, Sally K., "Holding Cost Study," Air University,
Air Force Logistics Management Center, Gunter AF
Station, Alabama, February 1978.
16. Kaiser, Robert D., Boisseau, H. J., "Army Inventory
Cost" Parameters, Logistics Management Institute,
Bethesda, Maryland, December 1974.
17. Harris, William R., Heidler
,
Clare D., "A Model For
Determining Economic Retention Levels of Expendable
Inventory Items," Air Force Institure of Technology,
School of Systems and Logistics, Wright-Patterson AFB,
Ohio, August 1975.
18. The Costs of Supply Operations
,
Harbridge House, Inc.,
11 Arlington St., Boston, Massachusetts, January 1959.
19. "Material Returns Criteria," Defense Logistics Agency,
Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia, August 1977.
20. "Field Test of the Economic Inventory Policy - National
System Final Report," Harbridge House, Inc., 11
Arlington St., Boston, Massachusetts, December 1960.
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